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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
BUSINESS CASE DlVJSION 
ST A TE OF GEORGIA 
CAMBRIDGE SWINERTON, LLC, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
V. ) 
) 
GILBANE BUILDING CO., ) 
TRAVELERS CAS. & SURETY CO. ) 
OF AMERICA, LLC, and WHOLESALE ) 
BUILDING PRODUCTS, INC., ) 
Defendants, ) _________________ ) 
WHOLESALE BUILDING PRODUCTS, INC.. ) 
Third Party Plainti1l ) 
) 
V. ) 
) 
NEW ALENCO WINDOWS, LTD., ) 
Third Party Defendant. ) 
CIVIL ACTION FILE NO.: 
2016CY2745 I 3 
Bus. Cl. Div. I 
ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS 
The above styled matter is before the Court on: (I) New Alenco Window, Ltd. 's Motion 
for Reconsideration of the Court's Order Granting Gilbane Building Company's Motion to 
Compel ("New Alenco's Motion for Reconsideration"); (2) Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff 
Wholesale Building Products, Inc.ls Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Wholesale's 
Summary Judgment Motion"); and (3) Third Party Defendant New Alenco Window, Ltd.'s 
Motion for Summary Judgment ("New Alenco's Summary Judgment Motion"). Having 
considered the entire record, the Court finds as follows: 
SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS 
Cambridge Swinerton, LLC ("CS") was a subcontractor hired by Gilbane Building Co. 
("Gilbane") for a mixed use construction project known as Emory Point Phase II ("Project"), 
owned by EP II, LLC ("EP"). Gilbane served as the general contractor and construction manager 
while CS was the "trade contractor" responsible for the completion of certain scopes of work. As 
part of its scope of work CS was to procure Ply Gem 1100 series windows for the Project which 
they purchased from Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Wholesale Building Products 
("Wholesale'} Wholesale, a construction materials supplier, purchased the Ply Gem windows 
from New Alenco Windows Ltd. a/k/a PlyGem Industries ("New Alenco") for $387,013.06. 
CS and Wholesale's agreement concerning the windows was memorialized in a Purchase 
Order dated Dec. 31 2013 ("Wholesale Purchase Order"). 1 The Wholesale Purchase Order 
contained a description of the required windows and two "General Comments": (I) "All window 
assemblies shall be Ply Gem Series HP 1100 Almond, Vinyl, per approved submittals" 
(emphasis added); and (2) ·'NOTE: Window pricing is good through September 19, 2014, for the 
items and quantities as listed on WBP quote #l 2 l 8gk2, dated December 18, 2013." 
Before the Wholesale Purchase Order was executed. CS provided a window submittal to 
Gilbane and EP's representative concerning the windows required for the Project that contained 
plans and specifications related to the Ply Gem windows ("Window Submittal"). The Window 
Submittal was ultimately approved by CS on Jan. 17, 2014, approved by Gilbane on Jan. 27, 
2014, and approved by the owner's representative on Feb. 7, 2014. The Window Submittal 
includes a consumer limited warranty ("Ply Gem Warranty" or "Warranty") that states in 
pertinent part: 
This Limited Warranty covers 11 l O single hung, 1120/30 sliding window, 
1140 casement. 1150 double hung, 1160 awning and 1180 sliding patio 
door series products and extends only to the Original Purchaser. This 
Limited Warranty cannot be assigned or transferred by operation of law or 
otherwise and shall not be extended to any subsequent owners. 
Wholesale's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("MPS.I"), Ex. B. 
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WINDOW and DOOR 
Ply Gem Windows, warrants, subject to the conditions and restrictions 
contained herein, that Ply Gem Windows fenestration products shall be 
guaranteed against defects in materials and workmanship for a period of one 
(1) year. This warranty does not include parts that have been abused, 
misused, or not used for the purpose intended nor parts that have been 
damaged in shipments that are not the responsibility of Ply Gem Windows. 
lNSULA TED GLASS 
Ply Gem Windows insulated glass units to which this Limited Warranty 
applies contained in insulated glass windows and doors manufactured by 
Ply Gem Windows, shall be free from material obstruction of vision as a 
result of film accumulation on interior glass surfaces resulting exclusively 
from failure of the hermetic edge seal (from sources other than glass 
breakage or cracking) due to faulty manufacture by Ply Gem Windows for a 
period of ten (10) years from date of manufacture of the Ply Gem Windows 
insulated window or door containing the unit. 
.If the unit fails to perform in accordance with the above statements during 
the applicable warranty period, Ply Gem Windows shal1, upon written 
notification and validation of the complaint by inspection by its designated 
representative, supply a replacement for the nonconforming unit or grant a 
credit for a portion of the cost of the unit as hereinafter specified. Ply Gem 
Windows' obligation under this Limited Warranty is to supply a 
replacement unit for the nonconforming unit FOB Ply Gem Windows' 
nearest active dealer to the installation during the first year of the Limited 
Warranty period. During the second year through the end of the tenth year 
of the Limited Warranty period, Ply Gem Windows' obligation is to issue a 
credit to the Original Purchaser toward purchasing a replacement unit 
manufactured by Ply Gem Windows. 
Labor of any kind or other costs to remove the non-conforming unit and/or 
to install the replacement unit is not included in this Limited Warranty. Ply 
Gem Windows shall bear no other expense of any kind and the Original 
Purchaser's exclusive remedy shall be replacemenl or credit on the basis 
stated. The Original Purchase shall pay and alJ labor costs necessary to 
install replacement units ... 
ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANT ABILITY AND 
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE LIMITED TN TIME TO 
THE DURATION OF THIS EXPRESS LlMITED WARRANTY. SOME 
STATES DO NOT ALLOW LIMTTATIONS ON HOW LONG AN 
IMPLIED WARRANTY LASTS SO THE ABOVE LIMITATION MAY 
NOT APPLY TO YOU. PLY OEM WINDOWS SHALL NOT BE 
..., 
_) 
LIABLE FOR ANY CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR INCIDENCTAL 
DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF ANY EXPRESS, WRITTEN, ORAL OR 
IMPLIED WARRAN TIES. YOUR EXCLUSfVE REMEDY SHALL BE 
REPLACEMENT OR CREDIT ONLY ON THE TERMS STATED IN 
THE EXPRESS LIMITED WARRANTY. SOME STATES DO NOT 
ALLOW THE EXCLUSION OR LIMITATION OF INCDENTAL OR 
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, SO THE ABOVE LIMITATION OR 
EXCLUSION MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU. 
Further, in ao email exchange between CS Project Manager, Zachary Brehm, and a Wholesale 
agent, Jennifer Collins, Mr. Brehm stated: "Warranty shall be I year on the frame and IO years 
on the glazing per Plygem [sic]:'2 
In response to the Wholesale Purchase Order, Wholesale then procured windows from 
New Alenco, the window manufacturer. Wholesale and New Alenco's agreement is 
memorialized in two purchase orders, both dated May 7, 2014 ("New Alenco Purchase Orders"). 
However, the New Alenco Purchase Orders contain no terms and conditions and no warranty and 
did not include the Window Submittal or the Ply Gem Warranty contained therein. 
According to CS the Ply Gem windows were defective from the outset in terms of 
window pressure rating and in terms of performance. The windows were to be designed pressure 
("DP") rated to ·'DP 40" but they allegedly were not.' Further, the windows were installed in 
October 2014 and allegedly leaked from the moment they were installed. The windows were 
tested by third parties for the ability to withstand water leaks, penetrations and intrusions and 
failed chamber testing in early October 2014. CS asserts New Alenco and Wholesale were 
immediately notified of the deficient windows, and Mr. Brehm avers that on the day the 
windows were discovered to be defective, Oct. 6, 2014, he requested that New Alenco and 
Wholesale replace any defective windows." However, New Alenco and Wholesale did not 
2 Wholesale's MPSJ, Ex. C. 
Brehm A ff., ii 15. See also Brehm Depo., p.135; compare Lloyd Depo., pp. 37-41. 
Brehm Aff., iJ16. 
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replace the defective windows or offer a credit but instead sought to identify and repair the 
problem. According to CS, on or about Oct. 21. 2014, New A Ienco technicians began repairs on 
the windows at buildings Dl and 02 and completed those repairs on or about Nov. 12, 2014. 
However, a "major rain event" on Nov. 17, 2014 resulted in water penetration at repaired 
windows in Building 01. Continued leaks were observed at the windows in building Dl Nov. 
23:.24, 2014 and the installed windows failed additional field leak tests on Dec. I, 2014 and Dec. 
18,2014. 
CS asserts EP declared Gilbaoe in default on Jan.9, 2015 because of the leaking Ply Gem 
windows and Gil bane, in turn, declared CS in default due to the windows. In February 2015, EP 
directed Gilbane to replace the windows on the Project with more expensive windows 
manufactured by a different company. On Dec. 3. 2015, CS sent a letter notifying Wholesale and 
New Alenco of its intent to back charge Wholesale for the allegedly deficient Ply Gem windows. 
claiming $2,452,327.80 in damages including direct and indirect damages. 
Although it appears undisputed the Ply Gem windows leaked after installation, the parties 
dispute the cause of the leaks and who is liable for any resulting damages. In this litigation, 
Gilbane has alleged CS and its supplier provided defective Ply Gem windows tbat leaked and did 
not meet the Project requirements and failed to provide any acceptable solution to cure the 
deficiency, requiring Gilbane to replace the windows and incur damages. CS has alleged 
Wholesale breached their supplier contract by providing defective goods and materials. In its 
Third Party Complaint, Wholesale asserts if it breached its supplier agreement with CS by 
providing defective goods and materials, New Alenco breached its agreement with Wholesale by 
providing it defective goods and materials. New Alenco previously has asserted CS's installation 
errors and/or improper storage of the Ply Gem windows caused or contributed to the leaks. 
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ANALYSIS 
I. NEW ALEN CO'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
On Jul. 11, 2018, the Court granted Gilbane and CS's Motion to Compel Deposition 
Testimony from New Alenco Windows, Ltd., therein compelling New Alenco to identify an 
appropriate representative to be deposed regarding claims or issues on other projects involving 
similar Ply Gem windows or other windows manufactured at the same facilities and granting 
Gilbane its reasonable attorney's fees incurred in filing the Motion to Compel. New Alenco now 
seeks reconsideration of that ruling, citing the changed procedural posture of the case (i.e., a 
settlement as between Gilbane, CS, and Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America, 
LLC) and Wholesale and New A Ienco ·s respective pending summary judgment motions. In the 
alternative, New A Ienco asks the Court to nar ow the scope of its prior order granting the Motion 
to Compel and limit any additional inquiry into incidents involving other Ply Glem windows to 
the specific windows at issue in this litigation. 
Having considered the record, for the reasons stated in Gilbane and CS's response briefs 
opposing the instant motion and given the Court's rulings on Wholesale and New Alenco's 
summary judgment motions (see Parts II and Ill, infi·a), New Alencos Motion for 
Reconsideration is hereby DENIED to the extent it seeks reconsideration or a narrowing of the 
Court's prior ruling and the award of attorney's fees to Gil bane under O.C.G.A. §9-11-37(a)(4). 
However, the Court will schedule a bearing as to the necessity and reasonableness of Gilbane's 
attorney's fees but will defer that hearing until the conclusion of any trial on the remaining 
claims at issue in this litigation. 
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II. WHOLESALE'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION 
A. Standard on Summary Judgment 
Summary judgment should be granted only when the movant shows "that there 1s no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled lo judgment as a matter 
of law." O.C.G.A. § 9-l 1-56(c). A defendant may do this by showing the court that the 
documents, affidavits, depositions and other evidence in the record reveal that there is no 
evidence sufficient to create a jury issue on at least one essential element of plaintiff's case. 
Scarbrough v. Hallam, 240 Ga. App. 829,830,525 S.E.2d 377,378 (1999) (quoting Lau's Corp. 
v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491,491.405 S.E.2d 474, 475-76 (1991). To avoid summary judgment, "an 
adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, 
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this Code section, must set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial." O.C.G.A. §9-l 1-56(e). 
Nevertheless, "at the summary judgment stage, courts are required to construe the 
evidence most favorably towards the nonmoving party, who is given the benefit of all reasonable 
doubts and possible inferences." Smith v. Tenet Health Sys. Spalding. Inc., 327 Ga. App. 878, 
879, 761 S.E.2d 409, 411 (2014) (citations and punctuation omitted). See Word v. Henderson, 
220 Ga. 846, 848. 142 S.E.2d 244, 246 (1965) ("Where the evidence on motion for summary 
judgment is ambiguous or doubtful, the party opposing the motion must be given the benefit of 
all reasonable doubts and of all favorable inferences and such evidence construed most favorably 
to the opposing party opposing the motion"). . 
B. Analysis and Conclusions of Law 
Wholesale moves the Court for partial summary judgment to limit CS's recovery, if any. 
against Wbolesale to the remedies set forth in Ply Gem's Warranly-replacement of the 
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windows or a credit for the amount paid for the windows. It argues the Wholesale Purchase 
Order incorporates by reference the Ply Gem Warranty insofar as it provides: "All window 
assemblies shall be PlyGem Series HP 1100 Almond. Vinyl, per approved submittals" 
(emphasis added). Since the Window Submittals included the Ply Gem Warranty, Wholesale 
contends the Warranty applies to contractually limit any recovery by CS against Wholesale for 
defective windows to window replacements or a credit for the purchase price. Wholesale asserts 
Mr. Brehm's Apr. 2, 2014 email indicating that "Warranty shall be 1 year on the frame and 10 
years on the glazing per Plygcm" [sic] (emphasis added) further confirms the parties' intent that 
the Ply Gem Warranty would apply as between Wholesale and CS. 
The Court finds questions of material fact preclude summary judgment. Wholesale is 
attempting to invoke the Ply Gem Warranty in order to restrict CS's remedies against it. 
However. "[pjrovisions severely restricting remedies act as exculpatory clauses." Imaging Sys. 
lnt'l. lnc. v. Magnetic Resonance Plus. Inc., 227 Ga. App. 641, 644-45, 490 S.E.2d 124, 128 
(1997) "Because exculpatory clauses waive substantial rights, could amount to an accord and 
satisfaction of future claims and require a meeting of the minds on the subject matter, they must 
be 'explicit, prominent, clear and unambiguous."' Parkside Ctr.. Ltd. v. Chicago land Vending. 
Inc., 250 Ga. App. 607,611,552 S.E.2d 557. 562 (2001) (quoting Depl. ofTransp. v. Arapaho 
Constr., 180 Ga. App. 341, 343(1), 349 S.E.2d 196 (1986)). 
Here, Wholesale argues the language "per approved submittals" in the Wholesale 
Purchase Order incorporates by reference the Ply Gem Warranty and exculpates it from any 
liability other than the replacement of the windows or a credit. Essentially Wholesale is 
attempting to avail itself of an exculpatory clause that, if applicable, expressly exculpates another 
party without any reference to Wholesale or a party that may resell the windows. Such is 
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impermissible given that to be enforceable exculpatory clauses must be "explicit, prominent, 
clear and unambiguous." Parkside Ctr .. Ltd., supra; Arapaho Constr., supra. The emails 
exchanged between the parties' representatives in March-April 2014 further highlight that 
questions of material fact exist as to whether CS and Wholesale intended the Ply Gem Warranty 
to apply to their transaction. 
Notably, even if the Ply Gem Warranty is enforceable as between Wholesale and CS, 
material questions of fact exists as to whether the windows were ever accepted or if they were 
timely rejected and, thus, whether the warranty applies to the parties' dispute. Pursuant to 
O.C.G.A. §ll-2-601: "[I]f the goods or the tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to 
the contract, the buyer may: (a) Reject the whole; or (b) Accept the whole; or (c) Accept any 
commercial unit or units and reject the rest." 
O.C.G.A. § 11-2-602 provides the manner and effect of a rightful rejection: 
(I) Rejection of goods must be within a reasonable time after their delivery 
or tender. It is ineffective unJess the buyer seasonably notifies the seller. 
(2) Subject to the provisions of Code Sections 1 1-2-603 and 11-2-604 on 
rejected goods: 
(a) After rejection any exercise of ownership by the buyer with respect 
to any commercial unit is wrongful as against the seller; and 
(b) [f the buyer has before rejection taken physical possession of goods 
in which he does not have a security interest under the provisions of 
this article (subsection (3) of Code Section 11-2-711 ), he is under a 
duty after rejection to bold them with reasonable care at the seller's 
disposition for a time sufficient to permit the seller to remove them; but 
(c) The buyer has no further obligations with regard to goods rightfully 
rejected. 
(3) The seller's rights with respect to goods wrongfully rejected are 
governed by the provisions of this article on seller's remedies in general 
(Code Section 1 1-2- 703). 
Further, O.C.G.A. § 11-2-608 allows for the revocation of a buyer's acceptance: 
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(1) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit 
whose nonconformity substantially impairs its value to him if he has 
accepted it: 
(a) On the reasonable assumption that its nonconformity would be 
cured and it has not been seasonably cured; or 
(b) Without discovery of such nonconformity if his acceptance was 
reasonably induced either by the difficulty of discovery before 
acceptance or by the seller's assurances. 
(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the 
buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before any 
substantial change in condition of the goods which is not caused by their 
own defects. It is not effective until the buyer notifies the seller of it. 
(3) A buyer who so revokes has the same rights and duties with regard to 
the goods involved as if he had rejected them. 
Bui see Griffith v. Stovall Tire & Marine. Inc., 174 Ga. App. 137, 138, 329 S.E.2d 234, 236 
(1985) ("[A]ny post-rejection exercise of ownership by the buyer with respect to the goods is 
wrongful as against the seller. .. Moreover, when a buyer fails to make an effective rejection or 
when he does any act inconsistent with the seller's ownership of goods, he has accepted them") 
(citing O.C.G.A. §§ I I-2-602(2)(a), 11-2-606(1 )(b). (c)). 
Here, Mr. Brehm, avers that in October 2014 when the windows were installed and tested 
and it was determined that they were defective, Wholesale and New Alenco were immediately 
notified" and he requested that the defective windows be replaced, stating in an Oct. 6, 2014 
email: "A Plygem [sic] window failed the field test today at Emory Point IT. See preliminary 
report from Brade below. We expect the factory to replace any windows that were not mulled 
correctly or do not perform to design criteria. Give me a call to discuss the next step.t" Rather 
Plaintiff Cambridge Swinerton, LLC's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant/Third Party 
Plaintiff Wholesale Building Products, lnc.'s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (''CS Response to Wholesale 
MPSJ''), Ex. I (Brehm Aff.) at~~ 15-16. 
6 CS Response to Wholesale MPSJ, Ex. 11 (Brehm emails) 
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than replace the windows, New Alenco tried to identify and repair the problem between October 
2014 and January 2015.7 
However, according to CS. when New Alenco's attempts to remediate the defective 
windows failed, the defective windows were rejected and the owner instructed that the windows 
be replaced with windows from another manufacturer. Whether there was an acceptance or a 
timely rejection of the windows under these alleged facts and whether CS, Gil bane, and/or ES 
took action with respect to the Ply Gem windows inconsistent with the seller's ownership of 
goods are material questions of fact that preclude summary judgment regarding the remedies 
available as against Wholesale. See Henco Advert.. Inc. v. Geographies. Inc., 155 Ga. App. 571, 
271 S.E.2d 704 (1980) (in action on account to recover amount owing for printing of advertising 
brochures, question of whether buyer's rejection was within reasonable time after delivery was 
for jury). Accordingly, having considered the entire record and given the above Wholesale's 
Summary Judgment Motion is hereby DENIED. 
Ill. NEW ALENCO'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTJON 
A. Standard on Summary ,Judgment 
As noted in Part II.A, supra, summary judgment may only be granted when the movant 
shows "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law." O.C.G.A. § 9-1 l-56(c). 
B. Analysis and Conclusions of Law 
Third-Party Defendant New Alenco moves for summary judgment as to all claims 
asserted against it by Wholesale, specifically: (I) breach of contract; (2) indemnity; and (3) 
attorneys' fees pursuant to O.C.G.A. § l 3-6-11. New A Ienco argues the Ply Gem Warranty 
applies as between it and Wholesale, limiting the remedies available to Wholesale, and that it is 
7 Brehm A ff. at~~ 16-17. 
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undisputed New Alenco did not breach the Ply Gem Warranty as it never refused to replace the 
windows or provide a credit. New Alenco also argues Wholesale is not entitled lo indemnity or 
contribution because Georgia law does not recognize a common law cause of action for 
contribution, there is no contract of indemnity, and there is no agent-principal or employer- 
employee relationship on which to base vicarious liability. Finally, New Alenco contends 
Wholesale's claim for attorneys' fees falls as a matter of law as attorney's fees can only be 
obtained on a prevailing claim where the party making the claim has shown that the opposing 
party acted in bad faith and. here, no evidence of bad faith has been introduced but rather the 
parties' claims evidence a bona fide dispute. 
I. Breach ofcontract 
Construing the evidence most favorably to Wholesale and giving it the benefit of all 
reasonable doubts and possible inferences, the Court finds questions of material fact preclude 
summary judgment as to its "breach of contract" claim. Although New Alenco asserts the Ply 
Gem Warranty applies as between it and Wholesale and that its compliance with the Warranty 
bars Wholesale's breach of contract claim as a matter of law, it is undisputed that the Warranty 
was not included with or expressly referenced in the New Alenco Purchase Orders.8 Further, 
although New Alenco asserts "the conduct of the parties clearly evidences ... [an] intention for the 
[Ply Gem] [W]arranty to become part of the agreement.t''' whether an express warranty was 
created thereby is not a matter that can be determined as a matter of law based on the record. See 
generally O.C.G.A. § 11-2-313.10 
8 See Deposition of Ryan Robertson, p. 81 (testifying the contract at issue between the parties as the New 
A Ienco Purchase Orders which did not include the Warranty form at the time). 
9 Third Party Defendant New A Ienco Window, Ltd. 's Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, p. 9. 
10 To the extent New A Ienco argues Wholesale should be estopped from denying the applicability of the Ply 
Gem Warranty given Wholesale's reliance on the Warranty in its Summary Judgment Motion (through the reference 
in the Wholesale Purchase Order to the Window Submittals which included the Ply Gem Warranty). a material 
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Moreover, even assuming the Ply Gem Warranty applies to limit Wholesale's remedies 
against New Alenco, there are material questions of fact as to whether New Alenco satisfied its 
obligations under the Warranty. There is at least some evidence in the record that in October 
20 I 4 when the Ply Gem windows were installed and first failed field tests CS expressed its 
expectation that the "factory ... replace any windows that were not mulled correctly or do not 
perform to design criteria."!' However, shortly thereafter, New Alenco began attempts to repair 
the windows, apparently with the knowledge and consent of EP, Gilbane, CS, and Wholesale. 1t 
was not until months later, in February 2015, that EP decided to replace the windows entirely, 
allegedly due to continued leaks and problems with the windows. Although New Alenco asserts 
Wholesale's breach of contract claim is barred insofar as it was not given a final opportunity to 
repair the windows, whether New Alenco's actions comport with its obligations under the PJy 
Gem Warranty and whether it was given reasonable time to address the window leaks are jury 
questions which would still preclude summary judgment. 
Finally, if the Ply Gem Warranty does not apply as between New Alenco and Wholesale, 
the Court finds Wholesale may pursue a breach of implied warranty claim. In its Third Party 
Complaint and with respect to its "breach of contract" claim Wholesale alleges, inter alia: "[i]f 
[it] breached the [Wholesale] Purchase Order by providing defective goods and materials as 
alleged by [CS] in the Complaint, [New Alenco] breached its contract with [Wholesale] by 
providing defective goods and materials to [Wholesale]"; and "[i]f it is determined that 
[Wholesale] breached the [Wholesale] Purchase Order by providing detective goods and 
question of fact would exist as to whether Wholesale through its conduct is estopped from arguing the Warranty 
does not apply. See Smith v. Direct Media Corp., 247 Ga. App. 771, 773. 544 S.E.2d 762, 764 (200 I) ("Whether a 
party is estopped by his conduct is generally a question for the facrfinder to resolve") (citations omitted); AAF- 
McOuay. Inc. v. Willis, 308 Ga. App. 203, 218-19, 707 S.E.2d 508, 521 (2011) (''The existence of estoppel is 
generally a question for the factfinder to resolve") (citations omitted). 
11 CS Response to Wholesale MPSJ, Ex. 11 (Brehm emails). 
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materials as alleged by [CS] in the Complaint, [New Alenco] is liable to [Wholeale] for all of 
[CS]'s claims against [Wholesale]."12 Compare O.C.G.A. § 11-2-314(1) ("Unless excluded or 
modified (Code Section 11-2-3 I 6), a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in 
a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this 
Code section the serving for vaJue of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or 
elsewhere is a sale"); O.C.G.A. § 11-2-315 ('·Where the seller at the time of contracting has 
reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is 
relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless 
excluded or modified under Code Section 11-2-316 an implied warranty that the goods shall be 
fit for such purpose"). 
The Court finds Wholesale's allegations are broad enough to encompass a claim for 
breach of implied warranty and are sufficient to place New AJenco on notice of same. See 
Rogers v. Rockdale Cty., I 87 Ga. App. 658, 660, 371 S.E.2d 189, 191 (1988) ("(T]he well 
established rule in Georgia is that, under our system of notice pleading, the substance, rather than 
the nomenclature, of legal pleadings determines their nature") (citing Cotton v. Fed. Land Bank, 
246 Ga. 188, 191, 269 S.E.2cl 422 (1980)). Given all of the above, New Alenco's Summary 
Judgment Motion is DENIED as to the breach of contract claim. 
2. Indemnity 
"Georgia law defines indemnity as the obligation or duty resting on one person to make 
good any loss or damage another has incurred by acting at his request or for his benefit." 
Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Georgia Dep't of Transp., 319 Ga. App. 47, 49, 735 S.E.2d 86, 89 (2012) 
(quoting Lanier at McEver v. Planners & Engineer's Collaborative, 284 Ga. 204, 206(2), 663 
S.E.2d 240 (2008)). Further, Georgia law recognizes "two broad categories of indemnity: 
12 Third-Party Complaint, ~ii 15-16. 
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indemnity as created by contract, as between a surety and a debtor; and under the common law of 
vicarious liability, as between principals and agents." District Owners Ass'n. lnc. v. AMEC 
Environmental & Infrastructure. IJ1c., 322 Ga. App. 713, 715 (2013). 13 
An action arising under the common law of vicarious liability may be maintained when a 
person is compelled to pay damages because of negligence imputed to him as a result of a tort 
committed by another. Id. at 7 I 5-16. However, to be liable under an imputed negligence or 
vicarious liability theory, a legally recognized relationship such as that of a principal and an 
agent or an employer and an employee must be present. ld. at 716; McKinney v. Burke, 108 
Ga.App. 501, 504 ( 1963). ("[I]mputed neg! igence must rest on an agency relationship"). The 
relationship of a principal and an agent arises whenever one person, expressly or by implication, 
authorizes another to act for him or subsequently ratifies the acts of another on his behalf. See 
O.C.G.A. § l 0-6-1. Further, in order for a principal relationship to be present, the principal must 
have the right to control the acts of the agent, without this control, there is no relationship. See 
Fulton C.S.R. Co. v. McConnell, 87 Ga. 756, 759 (1891) ("The latter company ... was not to be 
subject to the direction or control of the former company. This made [the company] an 
independent contractor, and not the servant or agent of [the former company)"). Imputation io 
the employment context arises under the doctrine of vicarious liability, in which the employer- 
principal becomes liable for the tortious acts of its employee-agent if such acts occur in the 
course of employment. See Anthony v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs .. Inc., 287 Ga. 448,450, 697 S.E.2d 
166, 169 (2010). 
Notably, Georgia no longer recognizes claims for common law contribution. See Dist. Owners Ass'n, Inc. 
v. AMEC Envtl. & Infrastructure. Inc., 322 Ga. App. at 715 ("[O]ur Supreme Court has held that "[a]s to 
contribution. O.C.G.A. §5 l-12-33(b) flatly states that apportioned damages 'shall not be subject to any right of 
contribution'") (quoting Mc Reynolds v. Krebs, 290 Ga. 850. 852( I )(b), 725 S.E.2d 584(2012)). 
IJ 
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Here, no contractual indemnity exists as between New Alenco and Wholesale because the 
New Alenco Purchase Orders did not include an indemnification provision. Further, vicarious 
liability does not apply because there is no employer/employee or principal/agent relationship as 
between the parties. Although the parties had a contractual relationship. there is no indication 
Wholesale was acting as an agent of New Alenco (e.g., that New A Ienco directed or controlled 
Wholesales work) such that the acts of one would be imputed on the other for liability purposes 
under a theory of vicarious liability. As a mere purchaser of goods manufactured by New 
Alenco, no principal/agent or employer/employee relationship existed between the parties. 
precluding indemnity under a theory of imputed negligence. Insofar as, here, there is no basis for 
contractual indemnification nor indemnification under the common law of vicarious liability, 
WholesaJe's indemnity claim fails as a matter of law. Accordingly, New Alenco's Summary 
Judgment Motion is GRANTED with respect to Wholesale's claim for indemnification. 
3. Attorneys 'fees 
"An award of attorney fees [and] costs ... is derivative of a plaintiffs substantive claims." 
Racette v. Bank of Am .. N.A., 318 Ga. App. 171, 181, 733 S.E.2d 457,466 (2012) (citing 
DaimJerChrysler Motors Co. v. Clemente. 294 Ga. App. 38, 52(5), 668 S.E.2d 737 (2008)). 
Specifically, with respect to bad faith fees under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11, that Code Section 
provides: 
The expenses of litigation generally shall not be allowed as a part of the 
damages; but where the plaintiff has specially pleaded and has made 
prayer therefor and where the defendant has acted in bad faith, has been 
stubbornly litigious, or has caused the plaintiff unnecessary trouble and 
expense, the jury may allow them. 
"As indicated by the plain language of the statute, the determination of whether there has been 
bad faith in support of an award pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 is normally an issue for a jury." 
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Metro Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless v. Ichthus Community Trust, 298 Ga. 22 l, 238 (5), 
780 S.E.2d 311 (2015). Here, insofar as Wholesale's breach of contract claim remains for 
adjudication and given the record, the Court will DENY New Alencos Summary Judgment 
Motion with respect to Wholesale's claim for attorney's fees at this time. Upon presentation of 
the evidence at trial. New A Ienco may if appropriate raise the issue via an appropriate motion. 
IV. Case Management and Trial Schedule 
1n light of the Court's rulings above and the Court' s Order Granting Plaintiff Cambridge 
Swinerton, LLC's Motion for Leave to Amend the First Amended Complaint to Add Direct 
Claims Against Third-Party Defendant New Alenco Windows, Ltd. (being entered 
contemporaneously herewith), the Court directs the parties to confer with respect to any 
remaining case management issues (including the deposition ordered by the Court with respect to 
GiJbane and CS's Motion to Compel as well as proper service of CS's Second Amended 
Complaint and any limited discovery needed with respect to the newly asserted direct claims of 
CS against New Alenco) and report back to the Court with a proposed scheduling order within 
fifteen (15) days of this order. 
SO ORDERED this / ~ay of October, 2018. 
JOJ;;-il¥o:e:{%;if q 
ALICE D. BONNER, SENIOR JUDGE 
Fulton County Superior Court 
Business Case Division 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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